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1. Introduction
The open economy extension of Ramsey’s model  is characterised by external  position 
indeterminacy.  This is due to the fact that the representative agent has fixed time preference. 
Authors like Obstfeld (1980, 1981, 1982), Svensson and Razin (1983), Pitchford (1989, 1991), 
Engel and Ketzler (1989), Devereux and Shi (1991) have introduced variable time preference1 
in open economy study. One can address two critics to these developments. First, an increase in 
fiscal  pressure  will  induce  a  sharp  reduction  in  consumption  and  a  surplus  of  balance  of 
payments  in  order  to  keep  the  same  level  of  long term consumption.  This  is  contrary  to 
traditional view that the consumer will to smooth his life time consumption. Second, as time 
preference rate depends only on consumption, for some level of fixed world real interest rate, 
the small open economy will accumulate a rather significant wealth, likely to make its actions 
significant  on  international  financial  market,  so  invalidating  the  hypothesis  of  small  open 
economy without market power. One solution to these two problems is to do like ZEE  (1997 
who introduce a discount function depending on consumption and output ratio. But, as national 
output  represents  only  a  source  of  revenue.  It  is  not  a  necessarily  a  determinant  of  time 
preference.  The  time  preference  is  a  result  of  arbitrage  between  the  current  and  futures 
consumption  which is better represented by accumulated wealth. With this idea in mind,  we 
will  introduce  in  this  paper  the  wealth  effect  on  the  determination  of  endogenous  time 
preference. 
2. The Model
 Two alternatives formulations in our line can be formulated :
1) The accumulated wealth enters the subjective discount rate function :
1 The theory of endogenous time preference is first developped by Boehm-Bawerck (1912) and Fisher (1930). 
Koopmans  (1960),  Koopmans,  Diamond  and  Willamson  (1964),  Uzawa  (1968),  Epstein  and  Hynes (1983), 
Espstein (1987a, b) and Obstfeld (1990) have further contributed to it. Ryder and Heal (1973), Becker and Murphy 
(1988) and others have applied this « habit formation » to divers problems. 
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where, U[.] represents the life time utility of the representative consumer,  )0(C his life time 
consumption, [.]u  the temporary utility function with )(tc as consumption at time t , (.,.)θ the 
subjective discount function which depends on current consumption and accumulated wealth (
w ). 
2)  The  ratio  of  accumulated  wealth  to  output  ( y ,  a  fixed  dotation)  enters  the  subjective 
discount rate function :
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where the ratio yw /  can be considered as consumer’s sacrifice ratio during its past life. It can 
be positive or negative.
These  two  formulations  have  some  similar  implications  for  fiscal  policy  in  open 
economy. So, we resolve only the consumer’s program the first formulation. The concavity 
conditions of the utility function are verified (i.e.,  0)( >cu ,  0)(' >cu ,  0)('' <cu ). We admit 
also, 0(.,.) >θ , 0'2 >θ , 022 >θ , 0'1 >θ , 0'11 >θ  02112 >= θθ . 
Defined { }dsrswsct∫ ∗−=Θ 0 )](),([θ  with ∗r as the world real interest rate and 0)0( =Θ . 
Its time derivative is given out as:
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The consumer’s problem becomes then:
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under the dynamic constraint (3) and the following budgetary constraint :
                                 )()()( ttctywrw τ−−+= ∗ ,                                                                   (5)
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where )(tτ  represents taxes or redistribution revenues ; w  can be seen as the external position 
of the small economy ;  ∗r is the interest rate on the international financial market. When w  is 
positive, the small economy lends to the rest of the world. Inversely, when  w  is negative, it 
borrows from the rest of the world at the same condition.   
The Hamiltonian associated with this problem is :
{ }∗∗Θ− −−−−++= rtwtctttctywrtetcuH t )](),([)()]()()()[()]([ )( θφτλ  ,              (6)
where  )(tφ  and  )(tλ are multipliers associated respectively with (3) and (5). The first-order 
necessary conditions are written as :
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Noting )()( tet Θ= λλ

 and )()( tet Θ= φφ  , the previous conditions can be rewritten as:
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The intertemporal time preference rate can be defined as follows:
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In  differentiating  (10)  to  time  and  in  substituting  the  terms   λ ,  λ and  φ  by  their 
expressions given  by (10)-(12) in the resulting equation, one can obtain the short-run dynamic 
equation of consumption:
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3. Stability analysis
Equations (5), (12) and (13) constitute the dynamic system. Its linear form is given as 
follows: 
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The determinant of the stability matrix: 
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As 0),(''22 >wcθ , 0),(''12 >wcθ 2, one has 1ϕ , 2ϕ , 03 >ϕ . The determinant is then negative if 
one can demonstrate that 0)],()('[),( '1
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The negativity of the determinant and positivity of the trace mean that the system possesses one 
stable engenvalue and two unstable engenvalues. As there are one predetermined variable ( w ) 
and two non predertmined variables (φ  and c ), the system has a saddle-point equilibrium.
2 The condition 0),(''22 >wcθ  is necessay for ensuring the concavity of objective function and the concavity of the 
Hamiltonian function in terms of w as 0''222
2
<−=
∂
∂ φθ
w
H . The condition 0),(''12 >wcθ  imposes a certain degree of 
complentarity between consumption and accumulated wealth in the time preference function. 
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To show that 0)],()('[),( '1'2 >−+−=Ω ∗ wccurwc φθφθ , consider (10) and (11) at steady state. 
That gives : 
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At the steady state, the diminution of the marginal value of wealth must be exactly equal to the 
excess of the real interest rate over the subjecctive discount rate. In models where the wealth 
does not enter the time preference function, one has simply: ).(cr θ=∗
5. The long term effects of fiscal policies and the short-run dynamics
The steady state of the economy is described by the following equations
                                  0)(),( =− cuwcθφ ,                                                                          (16)
                                 0
),()('
),(
'
1
'
2
=−
−
+ ∗r
wccu
wc
φθ
θφρ ,  with ),( wcθρ =                              (17)
                                 0)( 00 =−−+
∗ τtcywr .                                                                     (18)
.  Consider  a  budget  equilibrating  fiscal  policy  g∆=∆τ (taxes  =  spending).  Its  effects  on 
consumption, wealth and marginal value of wealth which can be deduced in differentiating 
(16)-(18) : 
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The determinant of the Jacobian is negative as demonstrated before:
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The solution of this system is:
                    τ
φ
d
A
A
A
d
wd
cd








∆
=








13
12
111
,                      (20)
with, 
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A fiscal policy will have a negative effect on long term consumption under the condition
0' '2
''
12 >− θφθ u , a positive effect on wealth and a negative effect on the marginal  value of 
wealth. 
As the system has  one  stable  engenvalue,  the solution  under  perfect  foresight  can  be 
written as :
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where  2111,VV  and  31V  sont les éléments of engenvector corresponding to  1λ , and  1k can be 
found in resolving the following equation  at 0=t :
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As  w  is a predetermined variable, its value at  0=t is given by  )0(w . Using this result, we 
have, 211 /])0([ Vwwk −= . Then, we can rewrite the solution of dynamic system as follows :
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As the consumption  and the marginal  value of wealth have an increasing time path, these 
results signify that they will experience an initial downward over-adjustment.  
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Figure 1. Time path of consumption, weath, marginal value of wealth and taxes.
6. Conclusion 
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The formulation of endogenous time preference is one fashion to escape from external 
position  indeterminacy  problem  in  representative  agent  open  economy  model.  The  first 
generation of the endogenous time preference has the non desired effect of accentuating the 
short-run movement of consumption and a strong accumulation of wealth when government 
increases  its  spending and  taxes.  In  introducing  wealth  in  the  discount  rate  function,  our 
formulation attenuate these effects and constitutes an interesting extension.  The rationale for 
this formulation is that, the time preference is a relative variable which depends on relative 
importance between current consumption and wealth (future consumption).
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